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finds that the effects of Super PAC spending are minimal, specific to long-shot candidates, and situational.   
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Introduction 
 
During the course of the 2012 presidential election, Super PACs were, as new and 
exceedingly controversial facets of modern campaigns, covered extensively by the national news 
media. Given the “horserace” style of media attention that candidates receive during presidential 
elections, the journalistic allure of largely unregulated, competitive political organizations raising 
and spending astronomical sums seems natural. Much of the media discourse on the subject has 
tended to present Super PAC spending as evidence of their influence, without examining how 
and to what extent such spending actually translates into shifts in polling and electoral outcomes. 
Their effectiveness in building and spending large “war chests” is presumed to indicate 
equivalent effectiveness in influencing voter choice and from this presumption stems 
apprehension that these organizations may be subversive to democratic ideals and electoral 
fairness. Embedded within such concerns is the troubling sentiment that individuals’ political 
efficacy is in some way diminished by the presence of these organizations, even though they wield 
no direct voting power.  
While little evidence exists to suggest whether Super PACs truly possess the high level of 
influence popularly attributed to them, there are valid reasons to be concerned about their 
societal impacts. Given that Super PACs have funded a considerable amount of negative 
advertising, their actions may be contributing to a loss of social welfare by spreading a sentiment 
of political disenchantment, which may, in turn, result in suppressed voter turnout. There may 
also be economic considerations at stake, as Super PACs may be expending their resources 
wastefully (in ways that are detrimental economic growth), and may be engaging in a sort of 
unsavory redistribution of wealth from politically concerned corporations and organizations to 
self-interested political elites. Concerns of these forms are certainly valid and merit investigation, 
but they are difficult to capture and examine with the data presently available and are not 
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directly relevant to the primary issue of Super PACs’ political influence. This principle concern, 
which lies at the heart of most Super PAC criticisms and could bear grave implications, is both 
highly deserving of prompt examination and fascinatingly out of tune with recent political science 
scholarship on the effects of electoral spending.  
 If such misgivings are justified and Super PACs do in fact possess the ability to radically 
sway voters’ choices by means of heavy spending, then these effects should presumably be most 
prominent in the nomination phase of the election. There is an extensive and well-developed 
body of literature examining the campaign factors that are most essential in determining electoral 
outcomes, and the many scholars have recognized that these factors generally carry the most 
weight during the nomination phase (Goldstein 1978; Nice 1987; Welch 1976). The basic 
intuition behind this finding is that in this early stage of the election, voters possess the least 
information about candidates and therefore have yet to develop fixed or “sticky” perceptions of 
candidates that ultimately inform vote choice. In line with this basic holding, this study will seek 
to focus on examining the influence of Super PAC spending within the Republican Primaries, 
which represent the only “true” nomination period of the 2012 presidential election cycle.1  
I proceed to evaluate the strength of Super PAC influence within this period by 
examining national polling trends for the top 7 candidates in the primary through the lens of a 
general model of campaign dynamics that accounts for several known and intuitive explanatory 
variables. Using a lagged fixed effects analysis that controls for time-invariant candidate 
differences as well as measures of media attention, candidate spending and fundraising, size of 
the candidate field, campaign “events,” and ends of FEC filing quarters, I find that Super PAC 
spending ultimately carries minimal explanatory power for polling variation. Negative or “anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Though Democratic Primaries technically took place in a number of states, President Obama’s incumbency 
rendered these primaries completely uncompetitive and, by extension, ill-suited for this analysis.  
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candidate” Super PAC expenditures are the only type that appear to have a significant effect on 
polling, but this impact is minute and appears to only matter for “long-shot” candidates about 
whom voters possessed relatively little information; for the higher profile, higher information 
“front-runner” candidates, Super PAC expenditures appear to have virtually no effect on polling.  
 
Literature Review 
 
 For reasons expounded upon in the forthcoming section, there is not currently a well-
developed body of literature that directly examines the extent and nature of Super PACs’ 
influence. However, among existing research, there are two fields of scholarship that are of 
particular import to this analysis. The first explores how campaign spending operates within 
models of campaign dynamics and how useful such spending is in terms of impacting electoral 
outcomes relative to other variables. This literature develops a framework for understanding how 
campaign variables interact and suggests how Super PAC spending- for which campaign 
spending could be viewed as a sort of proxy variable- might operate in relation to these variables. 
The second examines the effects of political advertisements, which serve as Super PACs’ primary 
method of exerting influence. Given the growing affinity for negative advertising within national 
political spheres, Super PACs should naturally be expected to allocate most of their resources 
towards the production and distribution of “attack” advertisements. As such, the literature in this 
area will largely be drawn from studies focusing on the specific impacts of negative advertising.  
 
Campaign Spending as a Proxy for Super PAC Spending 
 
A defining and academically significant characteristic of the presidential nomination 
process is that it is frequently subject to change.  The introduction of such changes- some of the 
more prominent have included the advent of primaries at the turn of the 20th century, the 
McGovern-Fraser reforms of the 1970s, and, more recently, scheduling changes of state 
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primaries- demand that scholars in the field of presidential nominations constantly revisit and 
revise their conceptions of nomination dynamics to accord with new developments. The 
introduction of the popularly termed “Super PAC”, or independent expenditure-only committee, 
which was established in 2010 as a product of two federal judicial rulings- Citizens United v. FEC 
and SpeechNow.org v. FEC- represents one of the most recent changes to the nomination process. 
As the 2012 presidential election is the first to feature Super PACs, their exact impact on 
nomination dynamics and electoral outcomes remains unclear. However, what is known about 
these committees is that they are permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds from individuals, 
associations, corporations, and unions to explicitly endorse or oppose candidates of their 
choosing, with a key caveat being that they are not allowed to fund, accept funds from, or in any 
way coordinate with federal candidates or their campaign organizations.  These attributes make 
these committees structurally unique, but given that spending is obviously a major source of 
influence for these PACs and that there is a large pool of literature analyzing the electoral 
impacts of campaign spending, there may exist some indirect evidence about the effects these 
committees may have. 
 Scholarship in the field of campaign spending has, to date, generally affirmed that 
substantial campaign “war chests” are a necessary but insufficient component of victory in the 
presidential nomination process (e.g., Goldstein 1978; Haynes, et al. 1997; Norrander 1993). 
This finding essentially implies that, all other factors held constant, a candidate’s likelihood of 
victory should increase as his or her spending levels increase relative to those of his opponents. 
Beyond this basic consensus, however, there is a great deal of dissent about the precise extent to 
which campaign spending influences presidential electoral outcomes. In his analysis of the 1976 
election, Goldstein (1978) argued that the impact of campaign spending may be significant 
throughout presidential elections, but that it is generally greatest during the pre-nomination 
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period when voters’ perceptions of candidates are still malleable. Other scholars (Haynes, et al. 
1997; Norrander 1993) have contended that campaign spending operates as one of several 
significant causal factor in determining the outcomes in state primaries and caucuses, but that its 
influence can vary from contest to contest as other variables (i.e. momentum and candidates’ 
home states) become more important. While this literature underscores the importance of 
campaign fundraising and spending as an important electoral determinant, more recent 
scholarship (Cohen et al. 2008) indicates that, in the modern nomination system, the pure impact 
of campaign spending is much less influential than more central factors, such as the accumulation 
of candidate support amongst party insiders. 
 As more states have begun to hold their primaries and caucuses closer to the beginning of 
the primary season, nomination campaigns have similarly become increasingly front-loaded 
(Mayer and Busch 2004). Such a change could be seen as enhancing the potential for spending to 
influence the nomination process as some scholars (Bartels 1988) have indicated that such a 
change could allow candidates who develop early momentum to win a number of contests in 
rapid succession. However, other scholars (Cohen et al. 2008) have held that this change places a 
greater emphasis on how well candidates can develop support among party elites and, by 
extension, raise enough funds to campaign effectively during the invisible primary. In essence, 
the effect of a candidate’s campaign spending may diminish as contests become more closely 
packed together because voters may simply vote for those who are well-known and have 
established support among party elites at the start of the primary season. Morton and Williams 
(1998) examined this phenomenon in laboratory studies, finding that individuals were much less 
inclined to vote for lesser-known candidates when voting simultaneously as opposed to 
sequentially.  Hence, as Cohen et al, (2008) suggest, the modern front-loaded nomination 
campaign may be structured in such a way that diminishes the value of campaign spending 
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relative to that of garnering support among party elites before the primary begins. In this vein, 
they have found in their analysis that party endorsements serve as a better predictor of 
nomination outcomes than both campaign spending and national media coverage.  
 Though this scholarship emphasizes the significance of pre-nomination campaigning, 
further literature (Bartels 1988; Haynes et al. 1997; Christenson and Smidt 2012) suggests that 
performance in early contests may nonetheless play a significant role in determining nomination 
outcomes. Bartels (1988) argues that horserace coverage and coverage front-loading by the 
national media, particularly during the early primary contests, allows candidates to develop 
momentum if they merely perform better than expected. Christenson and Smidt (2012) found in 
their analysis of the 2008 presidential nominations that the success of campaigns in Iowa and 
New Hampshire in raising candidate’s state poll figures can produce a similar but less dramatic 
rise in national polls. These findings suggest that it may be the case that success in the invisible 
primary, though generally a powerful predictor of nomination outcomes, may not be sufficient to 
overcome factors more proximate to the primary vote. This provides some indirect theoretical 
support for the notion that campaign spending may be of great import in these early primary 
contests. If spending can be leveraged to cause a candidate to perform better than he was 
expected to then, in line with Goldstein’s (1978) analysis, candidate spending may prove 
especially influential in enhancing voter support in the earliest phases of the primary season.   
 Beyond momentum and support among party insiders, there are various other 
nomination factors that may mitigate the influence of campaign spending. Norrander (1993) 
suggests, for example, that a candidate’s home state, ideological extremity, and the type of 
contest (primary or caucus) also play a significant role in determining the outcomes of primary 
contests. These findings suggest that more ideologically extreme candidates tended to perform 
better in caucuses than in primary contests because caucuses tend to attract more ideologically 
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extreme voters. Haynes (1997) presents candidate viability, number of candidates in a race, and 
whether or not the candidate is an incumbent president or vice-president as additional factors of 
note in determining nomination outcomes. While more recent literature has tended to discount 
the collective significance of these factors relative to that of endorsements among party elites and 
large-scale fundraising in the invisible primary (Cohen et al. 2008), these factors should 
nonetheless be considered highly significant to nomination outcome models in so far as they may 
feed into other larger factors. This is particularly apparent for candidate viability, which may 
determine the extent to which candidates are able to secure party endorsements and raise funds.  
 Altogether, the literature on campaign spending (Cohen et al. 2008; Bartels 1988; Haynes 
1997; Norrander 1993; Goldstein 1978) tends to support the notion that campaign spending is 
significant, but has limited influential power relative because of the joint influence of other 
nomination dynamics. Using candidate spending as an approximate variable for Super PAC 
expenditures, this scholarship suggests that they may have very limited influence on nomination 
outcomes. However, while candidate spending may be the closest fit among existing nomination 
factors, it is not necessarily the case that the effects produced by Super PAC spending will 
necessarily match those of candidate spending. First of all, it bears mentioning that candidate 
spending will serve as a rival factor to Super PAC expenditures in influencing nomination 
outcomes, as they will presumably compete for the same share of explanatory power in 
nomination models. Second, as Goldstein (1978) argues, the influence of spending is not uniform, 
and how money is spent is meaningful in determining its electoral utility. As candidate spending 
includes unique expenditures such as those spent to fund candidate travels and appearances, 
there is a significant difference in the way these two types of funds are deployed. Super PAC 
expenditures are largely used for political advertisements, and the lack of coordination with 
candidates may provide these advertisements with a texture and impact that starkly differs from 
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that of candidate-funded advertisements. The distinct attributes of Super PAC spending and 
candidate spending greatly limits the extent to which they can be considered interchangeable, 
and by extension, the extent to which one can be used to predict the influence of the other. 
However, the literature on campaign spending is nonetheless significant in that it uncovers a 
variety of factors that influence nomination outcomes and provides a crude approximation of the 
extent to which Super PAC expenditures may influence nominations. Forthcoming literature on 
Super PAC effects, including this study, will be well served to take these factors into account 
when modeling the effects of these committees’ expenditures. 
 
Negative Advertising as a Mechanism for Super PAC Effects 
 
Many Super PACs proudly advertise themselves online as running lean and efficient 
operations that permit them to dedicate almost all of their funds towards the production and 
dissemination of political advertisements. Given that these advertisements serve as Super PACs’ 
primary medium for voter outreach, literature analyzing the impacts of political advertisements is 
highly pertinent to this study. There has been a growing proclivity among candidates and 
political committees to focus on the production of negative “attack” advertisements, and there 
exists little evidence to suggest that Super PACs are attempting to buck this trend. In fact, there 
are a number of reports suggesting that Super PACs have vigorously bought into this pattern and 
have primarily worked to produce negative advertisements. Hence, while literature exploring the 
effects of positive advertisements is of some value and relevance to this study, a greater emphasis 
will be placed on scholarship exploring the impacts of negative advertisements.   
 Though the effects of negative advertising have been explored fairly extensively, there is 
presently no consensus about there exact effects.  However, a common thread within this 
literature is a focus on the linkage between negative advertising and voter turnout, which is 
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widely presumed to be one of the primary mechanisms by which such advertising would impact 
electoral outcomes. Findings examining this relationship can be roughly divided into four general 
categories. Some scholars indicate that negative advertising has demobilizing and polarizing 
effects on the electorate (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). A related 
but slightly differentiated line of research has indicated that the effect of decreasing voter turnout 
is situational and depends heavily on how far along voters are in determining their choice of 
candidate (Krupnikov 2011). Others hold that negative advertising may actually improve voter 
turnout (Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Wattenberg and Brians 1999). A fourth and final 
category of this literature suggests that negative advertising actually has neither a mobilizing or 
demobilizing effect and is turnout-neutral (Finkel and Geer 1998; Krasno and Green 2008; Lau 
et al., 2007).   
 The dissent characterizing this field of study makes it difficult to predict precisely how 
Super PAC-funded negative advertisements would impact voter turnout. As such, it may be most 
productive to consider the mechanisms by which negative advertisements alter voters’ opinions 
or choices. As previously mentioned, recent findings indicate that the degree of advertising effects 
is highly reactive to how far along voters are in terms of choosing a candidate (Krupnikov 2011). 
The dynamic captured by this analysis is the interaction between existing candidate perceptions 
and new information. Krupnikov suggests in her analysis that negative advertising impacts voter 
choice in the pre-selection period (before a voter settles on a candidate), but only effects voter 
turnout in the post-selection period. The logic underlying this finding is that once voters have 
formed a conclusive decision as to the rank-order of candidates, they are unwilling to change 
their conceptions to account for new information. The only effect this new information can 
produce is to deter voters from acting upon their conceptions without actually changing the 
content of their conceptions. Within the context of this study, this dynamic suggests that 
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advertisements may have very different effects for front-runners than for lesser-known 
candidates. As front-runners are much more established and well known, voters are intuitively 
more likely to have more information about and, therefore, firmer perceptions of these 
candidates. Given these circumstances and assuming that advertising dynamics proceed as 
theorized, effects of negative advertising on vote choice should be greatest for long-shot 
candidates. 
Data 
 As the requisite data for this analysis was not situated in a single database, several sources 
were necessary to compile this study’s final data set. This selected data includes national polling 
for the top 7 candidates over 63 weeks of the Republican primary season, as well as Super PAC 
expenditures and a host of other variables (candidate spending, pro-candidate and anti-candidate 
PAC spending, candidate fundraising, media attention, the size of the candidate field, major 
campaign events, and FEC quarter-ends) that have been known to impact electoral outcomes. In 
sum, 7 of these latter variables were chosen to serve as controls in my analysis of the Super PAC 
expenditures-polling relationship.  In the sections to follow, I will outline the reasoning for 
variable selection, as well as the collection and modification process for each variable used in this 
study. 
National Candidate Polling 
 
 The choice of candidate polling as the dependent variable in this study should be fairly 
intuitive, as polls provide clear and direct measures for capturing changes in voter choice over 
time. Polling data is also generally available in a format that does not require modification. 
Hence, for this variable, I will merely provide an explanation of the rationale behind and the 
advantages of my decision to use national polling data provided by Real Clear Politics. 
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Though a great deal of potential sources were available for polling data, many of these 
sources provided polling that was scattered and contained a number of missing data points. This 
was particularly true for state-specific polling figures, which I opted not to use for this study for a 
variety of reasons. Though state polling could theoretically be matched up with in-state Super 
PAC spending to examine relationships, the growth of internet-based advertising, coupled with 
the general nationalization of the primary process by the national news media, renders state-
specific designations of expenditures somewhat misleading. On a number of occasions 
throughout the primary process, Super PAC-funded advertisements aimed at swaying voters in a 
particular state received national media coverage, thereby allowing them to have multi-state 
effects. Nationwide effects could also arise from Super PACs’ habitual use of social media sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to draw attention to their efforts and make their 
advertisements available for widespread public consumption. Given the high potential for 
national effects and the greater abundance of large sample national polls, the use of state polling 
figures did not seem appropriate for this analysis. Given the choice to proceed with national 
polling, I ultimately chose Real Clear Politics (RCP) among sources of national figures for three 
principal reasons. First, RCP provides an aggregated index of various national polls that may 
help mitigate the effects of sampling error within individual polls. Second, the 63-week period of 
polling data offered by RCP proved to be the longer than most other sources of polls and covered 
the vast majority of the “competitive” nomination period, a factor that may also be attributed to 
RCP’s polling aggregation.2  Third, RCPs polling figures were organized in a clear and highly 
accessible format that allowed for straightforward data collection.  
Super PAC Expenditures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  To clarify, the “competitive” period can be roughly understood to mean the time frame between candidates’ initial 
declarations of candidacy and the emergence of a clear-cut nomination victor. 
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 For this study’s primary independent variable, Super PAC spending, there were a 
number of different sources that could be used. A number of independent organizations such as 
Open Secrets and the Sunlight Foundation attempted to maintain updated records of Super 
PAC expenditures. However, although each of these sources claimed to have obtained their 
information from FEC filings, there were a multitude of inconsistencies in the reported spending 
totals for individual Super PACs. Though some of these differences may be attributed to simple 
human error, error may have also emerged from the Federal Election Commission’s allowance of 
filing “amendments.” These amendments were filed with the FEC whenever a spending report 
contained an error of some kind. Super PACs are required to notify the FEC of each expenditure 
within 24 or 48 hours, a requirement that was uniquely troublesome for larger committees that 
spent often. As a result of this prompt filing requirement, amendments were filed frequently and, 
in some cases, a single instance of spending would require three or more clarifying amendments. 
This sort of paperwork overload combined with “watchdog” organizations’ desire to update 
spending totals as quickly as possible set the stage for widespread error in these independent data 
sets. The Sunlight Foundation, which I identified as being the most well-organized and thorough 
among these organizations, openly addressed this concern and recommended the use of data 
directly provided by the FEC in the event of inconsistencies. On the basis of this 
recommendation, I ultimately chose to use the FEC’s Super PAC expenditure data set. This data 
was also not without its sources of error, as there were a number of duplicate spending entries- 
duplicates were entered into the data set whenever new amendments were filed. This should not 
be a great concern to my study, however, as I was able to identify and remove a great deal of 
these duplicates prior to proceeding with my analysis. 
 Beyond error-reducing modifications, I also sorted these spending totals by candidate and 
by tone. For each candidate, I created “for” and “against” categories of spending, and each 
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spending item was placed within the appropriate category, as determined information provided 
by the FEC for each spending item. Once organized in this fashion, the data was then converted 
from totals to weekly shares, to more clearly reflect how candidates were faring relative to one 
another in terms of receiving Super PAC support or opposition. This step also assisted in 
simplifying the terms within regression analysis, but this will be explained further in forthcoming 
sections.  
PAC and Candidate Spending 
 As these forms of spending predate the establishment of Super PACs and operate within 
different structural constraints, they are treated within this study as separate variables from Super 
PAC spending. As previously discussed, there is a sizeable amount of literature that explores the 
impacts of candidate spending. However, they also differ to some degree from one another, so 
PAC and candidate spending are also treated as separate entities. As previously discussed, there is 
a sizeable amount of literature that explores the impacts of candidate spending and suggests that 
it should be included models of campaign dynamics (Goldstein 1978; Haynes, et al. 1997; 
Norrander 1993). Though, even without this academic precedent, the motivation for including 
candidate spending and PAC spending should be fairly obvious. Regardless of their true impacts, 
these forms of spending indicate, at the very least, the extent to which candidates and political 
elites are attempting to influence voter choice at given points in time. These forms of influence 
may function in concert or in direct competition with Super PAC influence, but in either event 
these influences must be considered and controlled for in order to precisely determine the 
relationship between Super PAC spending and voter choice.  
 To maintain sourcing continuity, candidate and PAC spending figures were also drawn 
from data sets provided by the FEC. Fortunately, this data appeared to be free of duplication 
errors and was comparatively well-organized so, barring omission errors on the FEC’s part, the 
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data should be considered fairly accurate. PAC data was similar to that provided for Super PAC 
data in that each expenditure was identified as being spent in support or opposition of a 
particular candidate. The FEC does not provide as much detail about the nature of candidate 
spending items, so they were not reorganized in the way that PAC and Super PAC spending had 
been and were instead treated as their own categories. For the sake of consistent formatting and 
analytic simplicity, both of these types of spending items were also converted from totals to 
weekly shares.  
Candidate Fundraising 
 The inclusion of candidate fundraising within this analysis serves to capture two dynamics 
of nomination campaigns that would otherwise be difficult to quantify- elite support and 
momentum. These two dynamics are largely inter-related and may play a large role in 
determining electoral outcomes.  As indicated in recent scholarship, trends in candidate 
fundraising may serve as a viable indicator of these forces (Cohen et al. 2008). Therefore, absent 
easily accessible measures of these forces, campaign fundraising totals were collected to serve as a 
sort of rough metric of their combined effects. These fundraising totals were also drawn from 
data sets provided by the FEC, and were reformatted in the same fashion as the preceding 
variables- items were converted from totals to weekly shares.  
Media Attention 
 Just as spending totals could be seen as indicators of attempted influence by candidates 
and committees, the extent of candidates’ media attention could also be seen as a type of 
influence. Intuitively, the media’s choice to provide a candidate with more thorough coverage 
than another can be viewed as a way of presenting a candidate as being more worthy of 
attention- and depending on the tone of coverage- either more or less viable than his or her 
competitors. In this respect, the media’s distribution among candidates can be seen as an 
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important form of influence on campaign dynamics- particularly for candidates about whom 
voters possess very little information. To capture variations in media attention for the candidates, 
I chose to collect Google Trends metrics for each candidates over this study’s time period of 
interest. Given the growing trend away from paper media, it seemed most appropriate to use a 
measurement that focused on television or Internet coverage. Among available measures that 
met this description, Google Trends proved to be the easiest to access, collect, and organize. 
Furthermore, Google Trends is more versatile than a measure specific to particular types of 
media because Google searches for each candidate may be prompted by print, television, and 
Internet media coverage. Additionally, the data is provided in a convenient 0 to 100 scale that 
allows the data to be easily placed into regression analyses with the share-formatted variables 
previously described.  
Size of Candidate Field 
 Several scholars have demonstrated that the size of the candidate field can have an 
impact on individual candidates’ performance (Haynes et al., 1997; Norrander 1993). Given this 
variable’s demonstrated importance and high measurability, I opted to include it in this analysis. 
As preceding variables were only measured for the top 7 candidates in the Republican primary 
season, this variable will be measured out of 7 and will only capture entry and exit of these top-
performing candidates.  
Campaign Events and FEC Quarter-Ends 
 These dummy variables were included to account for major events during the Republican 
nomination process that may have prompted changes across all other variables in this analysis. 
For the campaign events variable, a “1” was used to mark weeks where the start of notable 
changes in polling and other metrics appeared to coincide with major events such as nationally-
televised debates or early primaries. Out of the 63-week period of interest for this study, four such 
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“campaign events” were identified- a debate in Goffstown, New Hampshire in week 18, a debate 
in Las Vegas, Nevada in week 36, the Iowa Caucus in week 47, and “Super Tuesday” in week 
56. These weeks were assigned values of “1,” and all other weeks were assigned a value of “0.” A 
similar coding style was used for the end-dates of FEC quarters. As candidates and committees 
may raise their competitive efforts at the ends of quarters to essentially “win” the quarter, shifts in 
spending, fundraising, and polling may be expected in the weeks closer to these deadlines. To 
account for this potential dynamic, a quarter-ends variable was included wherein each week 
containing the end of an FEC quarter was assigned a value of “1” and every other week was 
assigned a “0.” 
 
Methodology and Model Specification 
 As this study seeks to quantify the effects that Super PAC spending and other control 
variables have on national polling figures for each candidate, the use of a regression analyses 
seems highly intuitive. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis has been used by several 
scholars in similar studies seeking to quantify the impacts of candidate spending (Haynes et al. 
1997; Norrander 1993). However, a standard OLS regression analysis would be ill-suited for this 
particular study because it fails to account for nuances in the data set that could serve as potential 
sources of error. More specifically, a standard OLS regression model does not account for lagged 
effects, effects caused by time-invariant candidate characteristics, or autoregressive issues with 
polling data. For reasons that will be explained further, the advertising through which Super 
PACs’ cannot be reasonably expected to have immediate impacts on voter choice, making it 
inappropriate to use an un-lagged specification (like standard OLS). Furthermore, in forming 
general models of campaign dynamics, it must be recognized that, intuitively, different 
candidates will have unique baseline levels of support and, as such, candidate-specific (or entity-
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fixed) effects should be accounted for. Finally, given that polling figures are not random (they are 
to some degree related to past polling values), it is necessary to test for the existence of and, if 
necessary, control for a stochastic trend within the polling data. Without factoring in these 
troublesome aspects of the data, the model could yield inaccurate beta values and other dubious 
figures. Hence, I bore these concerns in mind and accounted for them in selecting this study’s 
model specification. 
 With these particular concerns in mind, a lagged, entity-fixed effects model that accounts 
for correlated error terms within the dependent variable would be ideal for analyzing this data 
set. However, in order to use such a model, a few pre-tests must be performed to determine 
whether or not the use of a fixed effects specification is appropriate and whether or not the 
dependent variable contains is likely to contain a unit autoregressive (AR) root for all panels 
(candidates). The pretest for the former involves performing both fixed effects and random effects 
regressions and then performing a Hausman test, which tests the null hypothesis that coefficients 
estimated by the random effects estimator are the same as those estimated by the fixed effects 
estimator. If the Hausman test yields a p-value lower than 0.05, indicating that the null 
hypothesis should be rejected and that difference in coefficients is systematic, then a fixed effects 
specification is applicable. Conversely, if the Hausman test yields a p-value that exceeds 0.05, 
then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the difference in coefficients is not systematic, 
which indicates that a random effects specification is more efficient and appropriate. For the data 
in this study, the test’s resultant p-value was 0.000, indicating that the null hypothesis could be 
rejected and that a fixed effects specification was appropriate. The results of this Hausman test 
are displayed in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Hausman Test Results for Fixed (FE) and Random Effects (RE) Estimators 
 FE Coefficients RE Coefficients Difference 
Google Trends 0.145 0.078  0.067 
Pro-Candidate Super 
PAC Spending -0.061 -0.021 -0.040 
Anti-Candidate Super 
PAC Spending 0.531 0.586 -0.055 
Pro-Candidate PAC 
Spending 6.721 2.832 3.889 
Anti-Candidate PAC 
Spending 6.583 12.606 -6.023 
Candidate Spending 0.106 0.184 -0.078 
Candidate 
Fundraising 0.050 0.183 -0.133 
Size of Candidate 
Field -1.476 -1.541 0.064 
Campaign Events -0.467 -0.058 -0.409 
FEC Quarter-Ends 1.031 1.121 -0.090 
 
Chi-squared: 527.95 
P-value: 0.000 
 
Having determined the applicability of the fixed effects specification, the next pretest 
involves determining whether or not the dependent variable- polling data- contains a unit AR 
root for all candidates. If this turns out to be the case, then there exists a stochastic trend within 
the dependent variable and the model must be adjusted to account for this potential source of 
error. To thoroughly evaluate the likelihood that polling contains a stochastic trend, two separate 
but similar tests can be performed. The results of these two tests, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Test and Phillips-Perron Test, both indicate that the presence of a unit root for all panels cannot 
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be ruled out and, therefore, a model that accounts for AR(1) disturbances is necessary.3 The 
results of each these tests are displayed in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.  
 
Table 2: Fisher-type Unit Root Test Based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
 Statistic P-value 
Inverse chi-squared  (P) 11.749 0.626 
Inverse normal         (Z) 1.429 0.924 
Inverse logit t(39)     (L*) 1.726 0.954 
Modified inverse chi-squared 
(Pm) 
-0.425 0.665 
 
Table 3: Fisher-type Unit Root Test Based on Phillips-Perron Tests 
 Statistic P-value 
Inverse chi-squared  (P) 5.418 0.979 
Inverse normal         (Z) 2.435 0.993 
Inverse logit t(39)     (L*) 2.706 0.995 
Modified inverse chi-squared 
(Pm) 
-1.622 0.948 
 
Simply put, the high p-values for the statistics calculated for each test, all of which well 
exceed 0.05, essentially indicate that the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root cannot 
be rejected. Once again, this finding confirms that it is necessary to use a specification that 
accounts for AR(1) disturbances. Beyond this and the aforementioned fixed effects specification, 
there remains only one significant modeling issue- determining the number of lags that should be 
used. As voters’ opinions of candidates obviously do not tend to change instantaneously following 
the release of new information or advertisements, there must be some adjustments within the 
regression model to account for the fact that effects of the independent variables will take time to 
occur. The concern, then, is determining the proper number of lags based on expectations about 
how long it takes for independent variables to take effect. A single lag would indicate a lag of one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For reasons explained below, each of these tests involved the use of 2 lags. However, it bears mentioning that the 
results were highly similar without the inclusion of these lags.  
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week, which is certainly more reasonable than the total exclusion of lags, but it may not 
adequately account for the time it takes for the majority of voters to be impacted by sources of 
external influence. Given the national news media’s incessant coverage of the nomination process 
and the Internet’s ability to expedite this process of disseminating sources of influences, it may be 
reasonable to expect the majority of voters to feel the effects of this study’s independent variables 
within roughly 2 weeks. Based on this consideration, 2 lags were used in this study’s regression 
analyses and in the preceding pre-tests, where applicable. However, for some of the variables, 
such as campaign events or Google trends, voter effects may take hold more rapidly than others, 
so the regression model will also include single-lag results to account for this possibility. This final 
specification completes the regression model needed for analysis of this data set. The results of 
this analysis will be described in the section to follow. 
Results 
 Before reviewing the result of the final regression analysis, some of the descriptive 
statistics and graphics that assisted in guiding this analysis should be briefly examined. Before 
performing regressions, I began by examining Pearson’s r statistics to provide a rough estimate of 
the strength of relationships I could expect between the independent variables and polling. The 
correlation results (displayed in Table 4 below) indicated that, while no variable had an 
extremely high correlation with polling, 5 variables emerged as having moderate correlations- 
Google Trends, Anti-Candidate Super PAC Spending, Candidate Spending, Candidate 
Fundraising, and Size of Candidate Field.4 The correlation values suggest that these variables 
may be the most likely to be significant components of the final regression model.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Moderate correlations are defined here as correlations where |r| exceeds 0.3. 
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Table 4: Pearson’s r Values (Independent Variables’ Correlations with Polling)5 
 Pearson’s r  
Google Trends 0.386 
Pro-Candidate Super PAC Spending 0.185 
Anti-Candidate Super PAC Spending 0.466 
Pro-Candidate PAC Spending 0.208 
Anti-Candidate PAC Spending 0.293 
Candidate Spending 0.482 
Candidate Fundraising 0.578 
Size of Candidate Field -0.358 
Campaign Events 0.034 
FEC Quarter-Ends 0.019 
  
Beyond these correlation statistics, graphical representations of candidates’ polling and 
other candidate-specific variables over the 63-week period of interest played a significant role in 
shaping this analysis. Aside from the interesting contrasts they display in terms of candidate 
variable fluctuations, the primary value of these representations was their aid in determining 
which weeks should be designated as containing a “campaign event.” For determining these 
event weeks, the most prominent factors considered were multi-candidate shifts in polling and 
candidate exits, though changes in other variables were also taken into account. These graphical 
representations for each of the 7 candidates included in this analysis are displayed below (Graphs 
1-7). One final instrumental graph (Graph 8 below) displays polling trends for all candidates 
throughout the nomination process. As these graphs will supplement and enrich this study’s 
analysis of campaign dynamics in the 2012 Republican Primaries and may perhaps provide 
insights that translate to future elections, critical trends and characteristics of these 
representations are discussed below.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  As the bottom three variables are measured on different scales from the other variables, a Pearson’s r test may not 
be the ideal test for determining correlations with polling. The resultant figures, particularly for the two binary 
variables, may be somewhat imprecise.    
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Candidate Polling: Graphs and Trends 
Graph 1 (Mitt Romney): 
 
 
Graph 2 (Newt Gingrich): 
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Graph 3 (Ron Paul): 
 
Graph 4 (Rick Santorum): 
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Graph 5 (Rick Perry): 
 
Graph 6 (Herman Cain): 
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Graph 7 (Michelle Bachmann): 
 
Graph 8 (Polling Overlay): 
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 Without yet exploring candidate-specific campaign variable fluctuations, the polling 
overlay represented in Graph 8 provides an interesting framework for categorizing candidates on 
the basis of initial polling. Based on these initial conditions, Gingrich and Romney are the 
definitive lead candidates and are the only two candidates to open with polling shares of at least 
10%. All other candidates- including those who enter the race at later times- enter the race with 
shares that are well under 10%, indicating that these candidates have likely possess less campaign 
infrastructure and national clout within their party. These differences in baseline candidate 
support, which are examined in greater detail in the regression discussion to follow, partially 
inform this study’s distinction between “front-runner” and “long-shot” candidates. While this 
distinction may seem somewhat arbitrary, it ultimately provides an excellent framework for 
understanding how the polling trends proceed. Following the New Hampshire debate in week 18, 
the first identified campaign event, Bachmann, Perry, and Romney emerge as the three 
“winners” in terms of subsequent poll movement. All three receive positive momentum that 
extends beyond week 20, but shortly thereafter, a sequence of curious vote share redistributions 
take place between “long-shot” candidates. Visual analysis of polling trends for Romney and 
Gingrich suggests that their support losses are not proportional to the sizeable gains in support 
received by each of the “long-shot” candidates, which indicates that these candidates do not 
appear to develop momentum by extracting support from lead candidates. Instead, it appears 
that the momentum seen by long-shot candidates is largely a product of extracting support from 
one another. This exchange of momentum can be best understood as “long-shot” candidates’ 
inheritance of latent anti-“front-runner” support among the electorate. For simplicity, this type of 
anti-establishment support will be referred to as “off-brand” support in the discussion to follow.  
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 The redistribution of “off-brand” support begins to occur at Bachmann’s polling peak 
around week 24, which happens to coincide with a small trough for Perry. Not coincidentally, as 
Bachmann begins to wane in the polls, Perry begins to rise in a roughly proportional amount. 
Though less obvious in the graph, Perry’s rise also corresponds with declining poll figures for 
Cain and Santorum. The significance of these trends is that, in sum, they demonstrate that, as 
expected based on his “long-shot” designation, “off-brand” support shifts account for the 
majority of Perry’s gains. In the same vein, they also appear to account for his subsequent losses. 
Perry’s peak polling figures happen to align nearly perfectly with a Cain polling trough and, 
between week 30 and week 40, the two essentially trade places in the polls. In the course of his 
decline, Perry seems to surrender the small share of “front-runner” support he temporarily 
extracted from Romney’s base while the vast majority of his acquired “off-brand” support is 
directly transferred to Cain. Around the time of the second identified campaign event (a debate 
in Las Vegas), Cain and Romney reach high points in the polls that roughly correspond with a 
Gingrich low point. At this point, Gingrich had ostensibly become a “long-shot” as, in spite of his 
early advantages in terms of support and campaign infrastructure, he had fallen to fourth place. 
Interestingly, his new position as a de facto underdog may have diminished his perceived identity 
among the “off-brand” support pool as a “front-runner,” allowing him to achieve a dual appeal 
and garner support from both voter pools. Furthermore, at the time of Cain’s fall in the polls, 
there did not appear to be a true “long-shot” capable of overtaking Romney. Hence, by 
outperforming Cain and his fellow “long-shot” candidates in the second campaign event, 
Gingrich could theoretically surpass them and acquire a significant share of their “off-brand” 
support base while also re-establishing himself within “front-runner” support circles. In practice, 
this seems to have been exactly how this period unfolded, as Gingrich’s rapid rise in the polls 
following the second debate comes at the expense of both Cain and Romney. 
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 Shortly after week 40, Gingrich reaches a peak at about the same time that Romney 
experiences a small poling trough. As Gingrich’s support begins to fade after this peak, Romney’s 
poll figures seem to rise proportionally, indicating that these early losses merely represented shifts 
in “front-runner” support. In the period between Gingrich’s peak and the Iowa Caucus in week 
47 (the third campaign event), Gingrich and Romney essentially exchange “front-runner” 
support with one another while Perry and Bachmann exit the race. Though Gingrich did inherit 
a small portion of these candidates’ support, the lion’s share ultimately went to Santorum. After 
receiving this boost, Santorum went on to exceed popular expectations and perform very well in 
the Iowa Caucus, narrowly winning over Romney. Santorum’s unanticipated victory in Iowa 
seemed to establish him as the new “off-brand” favorite, as Gingrich subsequently experienced 
losses that were of equal scale to Santorum’s gains. As the total exchanged share of votes roughly 
approximates the amount that Gingrich acquired in the course of Cain’s decline, these changes 
likely derived from defections amongst voters in the “off-brand” support pool. Though these 
gains propelled Santorum to first place in the national polls, his reign as the party favorite was 
short-lived. In the weeks leading up to Super Tuesday (the fourth and final campaign event in 
week 56), Romney was beginning to regain some of the support that he had yielded to Santorum. 
However, after taking a sizeable delegate lead on Super Tuesday and essentially securing the 
nomination, Romney was able to take a convincing lead in the polls over Santorum whose 
figures remained stagnant until his departure from the race in week 61. With Santorum out of 
the race and Romney possessing an insurmountable lead, the bulk of the “off-brand” support 
pool seems to abandon its preference for a “long-shot.” Interestingly, it is only in the absence of a 
viable alternative that this group appears to turn to Romney.  
 The notion that candidates seemingly drew from different support pools depending on 
their perceived viability adds a wrinkle to the nomination cycle that had not been considered in 
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determining model specification. As this proved to be a recurring theme in the 2012 Republican 
Primaries, it bears considering how this analysis could attempt to capture this phenomenon. The 
case could be made easily that a general regression model for all candidates would fail to do so if 
it contained no control measure for candidate viability. However, as will be discussed in greater 
detail in subsequent sections, this study also includes separate regression analyses for both “front-
runner” and “long-shot” candidates. Though these designations are somewhat imperfect- for 
brief periods, Romney and Gingrich saw gains from the “off-brand” support pool despite being 
categorized as “front-runners”- candidates seemed to largely keep to their designations and 
garner support among their expected pools for the majority of the nomination cycle. Hence, the 
inclusion of these category-specific regressions should serve as an adequate control measure for 
viability effects and the potential for distinct voter pools. In this respect, the possible support pool 
phenomenon observed in Graph 8 primarily represents a reaffirmation of this study’s research 
design as, without the presence of a viability control measure, the general model could otherwise 
ultimately yield incomplete or misleading results. As anticipated, accounting for viability (based 
on initial conditions) should prove to be worthwhile. 
While each of the candidate-specific graphs yield some noteworthy results, many of these 
are difficult to explain and may have little value in the context of this study’s focus. Therefore, 
given that it may not be productive to attempt to disentangle the various trends and variable 
relationships for each candidate, the focus in the discussion to follow will be on the two most 
significant findings that emerge from these graphs. Arguably the most striking of these findings is 
that Ron Paul appears to have a nearly static support base for the entirety of the nomination 
period. With the exception of a slight but permanent rise in the polls following Cain’s exit from 
the race, Paul’s poll numbers remain virtually unchanged from week to week despite large 
fluctuations in other campaign variables. What this finding suggests is that Paul’s support base is 
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uniquely unwilling to defect and that Paul is unlikely to draw support from competitors. Perhaps 
the most feasible explanation for this is that Paul, a well-established and outspoken libertarian, 
has basically cornered an ideological market. As a result of being such a firmly positioned niche 
candidate, he is likely to gain and retain the support of the entire libertarian share of Republican 
primary voters, but he is also likely to alienate the more moderate voters that form the majority 
of the party electorate. In broader terms, this suggests that within the group of “long-shot” 
candidates, Super PAC spending and other campaign variables are unlikely to have a notable 
impact for the most extreme or ideologically unique candidates. The other prominent finding 
revealed in the candidate-specific graphs is that, with the obvious exception of Paul, polling 
figures for identified “long-shot” candidates seemed to be much more reactive to campaign 
variable fluctuations than those of “front-runner” candidates. The extension of this trend is that 
campaign variables are generally likely to have greater effects for “long-shot” candidates. This 
finding is highly significant to this study and is discussed in greater detail in the section to follow.  
 
Polling Regression Analyses 
Based on the collective insight provided by the preceding graphs and tables, I performed 
3 regression analyses, all including the specifications previously outlined. The first regression 
provides a general explanatory model of polling for all 7 major candidates. However, given the 
significant variation in electoral viability among these 7 (as well as the other differences described 
in the preceding section), candidates were then divided into two groups- “front-runner” 
candidates, who were nationally established and comparatively well known by voters at the start 
of the nomination cycle, and “long-shot” candidates, who were less established and less well-
known. Two separate regressions were then performed to examine differences in variable impacts 
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for these groups. The results of each of these regressions are discussed further and displayed in 
Tables 5-7 below (statistical significance indicated by bold print). 
 As displayed in Table 5, 5 variables had statistically significant beta coefficients at the 
0.05 level with two lags. Two of these variables, Google Trends and Candidate Fundraising, 
appear to have very small positive effects while the other three, Anti-Candidate Super PAC 
Spending, Size of Candidate Field, and FEC Quarter-Ends, appear to have negative effects of 
varying magnitudes. Among these significant variables, Size of Candidate Field and FEC 
Quarter-Ends appear to have the largest overall effect on polling figures, as adding a single 
candidate and reaching the end of an FEC filing quarter r produce average poling declines of 
1.13 and 0.65, respectively. These findings, as well as the findings suggesting that campaign 
events and candidate and PAC spending do not appear to have statistically significant impacts on 
polling in the general model, are all worthy of note. However, the most notable characteristic of 
the general model is the lack of large (or even moderate), statistically significant Super PAC 
effects. Within this model, only “negative” Super PAC spending yielded a significant effect. 
However, while this effect is negative, indicating that these expenditures are serving their 
intended purpose, it is also extremely minute. Specifically, as a candidate’s share of (received) 
negative Super PAC spending increases by 1 percent in a given week, the candidate’s poll figures 
should drop by only about 0.08. This finding, combined with the lack of a statistically significant 
beta value for Pro-Candidate Super PAC spending, demonstrates that within this general model 
Super PAC spending does not appear to have sizeable electoral implications.  
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Table 5: Entity-Fixed Effects Regression Results for all Candidates with AR(1) Disturbances 
(Including 1 and 2 Lags) 
 
Beta (β) 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t –statistics P-value 
Google Trends 
0.067 0.010 6.44 0.000 
0.023 0.011 2.16 0.032 
Pro-Candidate Super PAC 
Spending 
0.030 0.026 1.15 0.249 
0.023 0.026 0.89 0.374 
Anti-Candidate Super PAC 
Spending 
0.034 0.033 1.05 0.296 
-0.084 0.036 -2.31 0.021 
Pro-Candidate PAC Spending 
0.493 0.851 0.58 0.563 
0.467 0.826 0.57 0.572 
Anti-Candidate PAC Spending 
2.215 1.507 1.47 0.143 
0.886 1.566 0.57 0.572 
Candidate Spending 
-0.004 0.012 -0.37 0.715 
-0.003 0.011 -0.29 0.770 
Candidate Fundraising 
0.028 0.010 2.89 0.004 
0.022 0.010 2.23 0.027 
Size of Candidate Field 
-0.170 0.365 -0.47 0.641 
-1.130 0.364 -3.10 0.002 
Campaign Events 
-0.687 0.355 -1.93 0.054 
-0.220 0.353 -0.62 0.533 
FEC Quarter-Ends 
-0.489 0.305 -1.60 0.110 
-0.656 0.311 -2.11 0.035 
Constant 23.194 0.167 138.55 0.000 
 
R-squared Values: 
Within: 0.241 
Between: 0.402 
Overall: 0.401 
  
For the “front-runner” candidates, Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich, the results proved 
to be slightly different. With 2 lags, only two variables possessed statistically significant beta 
coefficients within this limited-candidate model. These significant variables, the Size of the 
Candidate Field and FEC Quarter-Ends, had the same roughly the same average effect within 
this as they did in the general model; both continued to have negative, significant beta 
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coefficients. However, there are a few elements of this model that distinguish it from the original. 
First, there are two variables- Google Trends and Campaign Events- that are only significant 
with a single lag. That these variables only have short-term effects should be unsurprising when 
they considered in light of these “front-runner” candidates’ unique attributes. As high 
information, high-profile candidates who were early leaders in the polls, these candidates were 
essentially the least capable of surprising voters one way or another. Romney, having run 
unsuccessfully in the 2008 Republican Primaries, had already been subjected to considerable 
media “vetting.” As a result of this, there was little about his background that had not already 
been brought to the public’s attention by the time he declared his candidacy for the 2012 contest. 
Similarly, Gingrich, known best as being a former Speaker of the House, had no major 
controversies in his past that had not already been explored by the media. Given these 
circumstances, it seems reasonable to expect that while voters may have knee-jerk swings towards 
choosing these candidates when they receive a media coverage “boost,” these effects are likely to 
be impermanent (a notion that seems to accord with the data in Table 6). Voters know the 
candidates so well that they generally have more “sticky” or fixed impressions of them relative to 
their competitors. This phenomenon also helps to explain the other unique characteristic of the 
“front-runners” model- the lack of any significant beta values for any forms of spending. As a 
consequence of their relative fame, each of these candidates is less likely to experience significant 
changes in terms of electoral “image”. Hence, as the various forms of spending during the 
primary season, including both types of Super PAC spending, are largely intended to alter voters’ 
perceptions of candidates, they are unlikely to have significant short or long-term effects for these 
candidates.  
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Table 6: Entity-Fixed Effects Regression Results for “Front-runners” with AR(1) Disturbances 
(Including 1 and 2 Lags) 
 
Beta (β) 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t –statistics P-value 
Google Trends 
0.181 0.032 5.62 0.000 
0.059 0.037 1.60 0.113 
Pro-Candidate Super PAC 
Spending 
-0.019 0.033 -0.58 0.564 
0.012 0.036 0.34 0.733 
Anti-Candidate Super PAC 
Spending 
-0.047 0.057 -0.81 0.418 
-0.079 0.054 -1.48 0.143 
Pro-Candidate PAC Spending 
19.720 13.714 1.44 0.154 
-0.503 14.207 -0.04 0.972 
Anti-Candidate PAC Spending 
1.769 2.469 0.72 0.476 
1.476 3.059 0.48 0.630 
Candidate Spending 
0.007 0.016 0.46 0.647 
-0.007 0.015 -0.49 0.627 
Candidate Fundraising 
0.005 0.014 0.35 0.729 
-0.004 0.014 -0.29 0.772 
Size of Candidate Field 
0.160 0.650 0.25 0.806 
-1.458 0.661 -2.20 0.030 
Campaign Events 
-1.638 0.679 -2.41 0.018 
-0.805 0.674 -1.19 0.235 
FEC Quarter-Ends 
-0.004 0.591 -0.01 0.994 
-1.205 0.588 -2.05 0.043 
Constant 29.716 0.293 101.39 0.000 
 
R-squared Values: 
Within: 0.453 
Between: 1.000 
Overall: 0.444 
  
For the regression model for the 5 remaining “long-shot” candidates produced starkly 
different results. The basic findings of this regression analysis can be summarized as follows: 2 
variables- Anti-Candidate Super PAC spending and Campaign Fundraising- had statistically 
significant beta coefficients with 2 lags, while 4 variables- Google Trends, Pro- and Anti-
Candidate forms of PAC Spending, and Campaign Fundraising- had statistically significant 
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single-lag beta coefficients. While the varied timing of these effects may be difficult to explain, the 
basic reasons behind the significant results should be fairly clear. As these lower-information, 
lower-profile candidates are relatively anonymous to the general public, voters are less likely to 
have rigid impressions of them. The voters’ comparatively pliable perceptions of these candidates 
opens the door for sources of influence that would not make a difference for the “front-runners”- 
specifically, fundraising and various forms of spending. The high statistical significance of the 
former, which was chosen for this analysis as a rough metric of elite support and momentum, 
should be considered especially predictable. Without their own name recognition, these 
candidates are heavily reliant on the endorsement power and resources of elites within their party 
to remain viable against the better-known front-runners. As it turns out, this variable is the only 
variable within the “long-shots” model to be statistically significant with both 1 and 2 lags- albeit 
with somewhat low beta coefficients of about 0.07- which attests to its high importance to these 
candidates. The intuitions that support this finding also contribute to explaining the significant 
effect of negative Super PAC spending. For little-known candidates, negative advertising could 
serve as their first exposure to voters and therefore, if they are executed properly, these ads can 
facilitate the formation of “sticky” negative opinions before the candidates ever get the chance to 
“make their case” to voters.  In spite of the fact that this logic could also be extended to explain 
the significant PAC beta values, these values are not as likely to be accurate given that PACs are 
relatively small-scale operations that do not factor heavily into overall spending. Hence, while the 
large, highly significant beta values for Pro- and Anti-Candidate PAC spending with a single lag, 
may be indicative of some actual PAC influence, the figures are more likely the result of an 
omitted variable that explains both PAC and poling variations. This could perhaps be reflective 
of support by party insiders, a factor that this model does not completely account for.  
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Table 7: Entity-Fixed Effects Regression Results for “Long-shots” with AR(1) Disturbances 
(Including 1 and 2 Lags) 
 
Beta (β) 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t –statistics P-value 
Google Trends 
0.039 0.011 3.71 0.000 
-0.007 0.010 -0.69 0.488 
Pro-Candidate Super PAC 
Spending 
0.052 0.072 0.72 0.472 
-0.054 0.075  -0.71 0.477 
Anti-Candidate Super PAC 
Spending 
-0.030 0.048 -0.62 0.539 
-0.357  0.089 -4.00 0.000 
Pro-Candidate PAC Spending 
3.190 1.041 3.06 0.002 
0.784   0.739 1.06 0.290 
Anti-Candidate PAC Spending 
4.188  2.083 2.01 0.046 
-0.199 1.963 -0.10 0.919 
Candidate Spending 
0.004 0.018 0.23 0.820 
-0.001 0.017 -0.03 0.976 
Candidate Fundraising 
0.071 0.014 4.93 0.000 
0.070  0.014 4.92 0.000 
Size of Candidate Field 
-0.325 0.399 -0.81 0.417 
-0.447 0.394 -1.14 0.258 
Campaign Events 
-0.208 0.380 -0.55 0.585 
0.292 0.373 0.78 0.435 
FEC Quarter-Ends 
-0.348 0.324 -1.08 0.283 
-0.169 0.325 -0.52 0.604 
Constant 19.717 0.146 135.05 0.000 
 
R-squared Values: 
Within: 0.327 
Between: 0.447 
Overall: 0.259 
 
Conclusion 
 Taken together, the results of this study’s three regression analyses indicate that, in their 
presidential trial run, Super PACs did not appear to have major electoral effects. Only negative 
Super PAC spending has been shown to have a discernible effect, but this effect is both 
diminutive and seemingly specific to “long-shot” candidates. For the “front-runner” candidates 
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whose party support and infrastructure advantages make them the most likely candidates to win 
the nomination, neither positive nor negative Super PAC spending yield noteworthy changes in 
polling. This central finding- that Super PACs were generally ineffective in altering voter choice- 
is highly promising, particularly for those concerned that these committees were enabling 
corporations to effectively purchase elections. Even if, to some extent, Super PACs’ 
ineffectiveness can be attributed to their novelty and inexperience, it seems unlikely for a number 
of reasons that necessary improvements could be made to produce a greater return-on-
investment to spending. First of all, the prevailing apprehension about the lack of regulatory 
oversight for these committees may prompt the establishment of new rules that could constrain 
Super PACs’ ability to grow and improve their operations. Second, the mechanism by which 
Super PACs attempt to sway voters, political advertising, is not likely to have dramatically 
different results from election to election. While political advertisements may, in some rare 
instances, galvanize a significant share of voters, they have been generally shown to have 
moderate to null effects on voter behavior. Finally, for ideologically extreme or unique 
candidates, such as Ron Paul, there is very little that Super PAC spending or even campaign 
variables in the aggregate could do to improve or diminish their standings in the polls. Upon 
taking these factors into consideration, it seems reasonable to expect that Super PAC spending 
should continue to operate in the same fashion in presidential races- with minimal and situational 
effects.  
Ultimately, the electoral prognosis for Super PACs is not optimistic if they are not 
cognizant of and willing to operate within their limits. Though general election dynamics are not 
analyzed here, this study’s findings coupled with existing literature on campaign dynamics 
suggest that Super PACs are highly unlikely to have effects in the general election, as voters are 
likely to have more information and more firmly entrenched perceptions of candidates during 
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that phase. Given this limitation, Super PACs seeking to maximize their impact should still 
devote the majority of their resources to influencing voters in the nomination period when their 
candidate perceptions are less “sticky.” Based on the models presented above, a clear optimal 
strategy emerges for these committees. The best return-on-investment for advertising would 
involve selecting a moderately competitive and non-extreme “long-shot” and attempting to 
support that candidate by eliminating off-brand support for that candidate’s fellow “long-shots.” 
If a Super PAC could ensure that funds could be dedicated in such an amount that 20% of total 
weekly Super PAC expenditures would be devoted to negative advertising against one of these 
competitors, then roughly 7% of the vote could become available for extraction (based on the 
model in Table 7). Should this strategy be repeated in such a way that top “long-shot” 
competitors are robbed of sizeable support shares in subsequent weeks, then the committee’s 
candidate of choice could be the natural inheritor of the off-brand support base and could 
conceivably compete well with establishment candidates. However, the difficulty associated with 
carrying out such a plan may render it impracticable. If all Super PACs took such an approach, it 
would be difficult to estimate what amount of money would be necessary to account for 20% of 
weekly spending and secure the desired change in the polls. Additionally complicating is the 
possibility that the 20% strategy outlined above could prove to be useless if an opposing Super 
PAC adopts a 30% or 25% strategy. Essentially, the race to outspend one another- a 
phenomenon that is highly unlikely to decline in the near future- makes the implementation of a 
fixed spending strategy extremely difficult. As a result of this seemingly unavoidable obstacle to 
planning, it is unlikely that Super PACs will be able to make the strategic changes necessary to 
significantly enhance their influence.  
However, even if there is presently little reason to suspect that Super PACs may enhance 
their influence, further study into the subject is nonetheless warranted.  With the Republican 
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Party currently exploring ways to broaden its support base, the candidate pool of 2012 may 
prove to be dramatically different from future Republican candidate pools. Furthermore, as this 
election only had one active primary, it may be possible that Democratic Primaries yield different 
Super PAC effects. Finally, this study’s narrow focus on aggregated data from the Republican 
presidential primary season may have led to a few potentially important omissions- namely, 
localized effects, general election effects, and effects within Senate and Congressional contests. 
For these reasons, further and more diffuse examination of Super PAC impacts is warranted to 
determine the accuracy and cross-election applicability of this study’s findings. Nevertheless, 
absent such scholarship, the findings presented here should be treated as sound evidence of Super 
PAC inefficacy, and by extension, as a cause for optimism for those concerned about electoral 
fairness. Based on the available evidence, there exists no reason to fear that Super PACs do or 
will pose a serious threat to the democratic process.  
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Supplementary Tables 
 
 
The following data tables provide additional statistics that may be of interest to scholars who wish 
to more firmly gauge the distribution and scale of Super PAC spending amongst the 7 
candidates. Tables 8A and 8B display Super PAC expenditure figures in terms of weekly shares, 
while Tables 9A and 9B display those figures in their raw dollar form.  
 
Table 8A: Descriptive Statistics for Pro-Candidate Super PAC Expenditures (%) 	   Bachmann Cain Gingrich Paul Perry Romney Santorum 
Mean 0.000 0.196 1.924 0.542 0.562 0.394 0.867 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.000 0.903 7.652 2.054 1.760 1.644 2.025 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.000 6.263 49.399 11.933 7.996 12.126 9.865 	  
Table 8B: Descriptive Statistics for Anti-Candidate Super PAC Expenditures (%) 	   Bachmann Cain Gingrich Paul Perry Romney Santorum 
Mean 0.000 0.000 1.506 0.000 0.000 1.792 2.402 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.000 0.000 3.777 0.001 0.000 5.977 6.979 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.000 0.000 16.416 0.010 0.000 38.956 30.210 	  
Table 9A: Descriptive Statistics for Pro-Candidate Super PAC Expenditures (Raw Totals) 	   Bachmann Cain Gingrich Paul Perry Romney Santorum 
Mean 0.00 15,169.47 537,125.00 125,154.30 61,683.32 58,753.84 142,253.10   
Standard 
Deviation 
0.00 73,586.85 2,584,460.00 597,599.60 192,671.30 207,888.90 348,251.10 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 0.00 552,990.00 18,085,415.20 4,472,094.00 876,530.00 1,448,413.00 1,790,264.00 	  
Table 9B: Descriptive Statistics for Anti-Candidate Super PAC Expenditures (Raw Totals) 	   Bachmann Cain Gingrich Paul Perry Romney Santorum 
Mean 0.00 0.00 305,093.90 27.44 0.00 360,394.60 350,993.20 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.00 0.00 960,274.70 186.08 0.00 1,866,213.00    1,058,473.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 0.00 0.00 6,010,188.00 1,455.90 0.00 14,598,854.69 5,482,304.00 	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Appendix 
 
 As briefly discussed in the Data section, the data provided by the FEC included 
systematic flaws. For the Super PAC expenditures data set, the FEC would, instead of replacing 
values where necessary, enter duplicate values whenever a Super PAC submitted a spending 
amendment. The prompt filing requirements set by the FEC resulted in a large volume of 
amendments, which made the data collection process incredibly difficult. Some duplicate entries 
were obvious, as there would be two identical spending items on the same day. However, finding 
other duplicates was much more involved, as Super PACs would submit amendments where they 
broke up spending totals into subtotals. For instance, a $1000 dollar spending item could be 
displayed on later amendments as five separate expenditures of $200. The opposite situation also 
arose in the data, with individual spending items being aggregated in subsequent amendments. 
To find errors of this kind, as well as more complex errors where some but not all spending items 
would be duplicated in a given day, suspicious figures in the data set needed to verified using the 
committees’ original filings. While these filings are available online for each committee, their 
volume is such that an exhaustive verification process would carry with it a prohibitive time cost. 
As such, it may be inevitable that expenditure data sets will contain some degree of error 
stemming from the FEC’s data compiling practices. Using independent non-governmental 
sources may be a sound alternative but those data sources also suffer from some degree of error 
and, without undertaking the enormous project of reviewing the original filings, it is difficult to 
assess the relative accuracy of each source. Those who wish to perform studies of this kind for 
future elections should be mindful of this data collection obstacle and would be well-served to 
provide accuracy disclaimers for models based on such questionable figures.  
